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I. Introduction
An important long-standing issue in corporate finance has been the relative merits of banks and financial markets as providers of capital. A macro-economic version of this question is whether the financial architecture of an economy -i.e. the degree to which its financial system is bank-oriented or market-based -has any impact on economic performance in the real sector. Does a financial architecture anchored on markets work better than one centered on banks, and if so, under what conditions?
The theoretical literature is sparse in its predictions whereby lacking a unified approach, different theories emphasize specific features of banks and markets. Opinions range from the position that financial architecture has no real consequences to arguments emphasizing the inherent superiority of either market-based system (e.g. Macey (1998)) or bank-based systems (e.g. Gilson and Roe (1993) . A middle ground position is to argue that the effectiveness of a particular architecture depends on a host of country specific factors. These may include the contractual environment of the country (e.g. Rajan and Zingales (1998b) ), the informational structure of participating firms (e.g. Boot and Thakor (1997) ), or the technological characteristics of the economy (Allen and Gale (1999b), Rajan and Zingales (1998b) ).
Financial markets and banks perform vital functions in an economy that may include capital formation, facilitation of risk sharing, information production and monitoring. The case for bank-based or market-oriented systems is made based on the relative effectiveness with which banks or markets execute these common functions.
Some argue that financial architecture is inconsequential to the real sector of the economy with the belief that banks and markets are complementary in providing financial services, and that neither has a natural advantage in the provision of all services.
According to this view, it is the quantity and quality of these financial services in an economy that matters; not the venue by which they are provided (see Levine (2002) in this issue).
Recent theoretical discussion on the issue takes a middle ground position by suggesting that financial system architecture (i.e. whether bank-oriented or market-based) may matter in that markets or banks may have a comparative advantage in delivering particular financial services depending on the economic and contractual environments of the country. This perspective relies on distinct differences, rather than the similarities, in the types of services provided by markets and banks. In particular, a key attribute of financial markets -a feature that distinguishes them from banks -is that equilibrium prices formed in markets provide valuable information (about the prospect of investment opportunities) to real decisions of firms. This is what is called the 'information feedback' function of markets. The relative importance of a given financial architecture (marketbased vs bank-based), therefore, depends on how effectively markets perform this "information feedback' function (supply side argument), and the value of market information to decision making in the firm (demand side argument).
On the supply side, the relative merits of markets versus banks depend on the effectiveness with which markets can perform their information feedback function. Well functioning markets rely on contracts and their legal enforceability. Weak legal systems and poor institutional infrastructure impedes the functioning of markets, reducing the supply of information feedback as a market function. Rajan and Zingales (1998b) argues that bank-based architecture survives and be more effective in these situations, because banks can use their power, in the absence of effective legal provision, to protect their interest. Hence market based systems work better where stronger contractual environments are in place and bank-based systems fare well where such is lacking.
On the demand side, one would expect a prevalence of market-based systems in situations where information feedback is especially valued. However, market-generated information is not always considered useful for various reasons. For example, the prevalence and severity of moral hazard attenuates the value of information feedback by financial markets. Boot and Thakor (1997) , for instance, argue that banks provide a superior resolution of post-lending moral hazard resulting from potential distortions in firms' investment choices while markets provide improvements in real decisions through the information feedback function. However, the greater the moral hazard problem in the economy, the lower is information acquisition in the financial markets, and the smaller the value of market information in affecting real decisions. The value of market information is, therefore, lower in economies dominated by firms that are prone to moral hazard problems, implying that a bank-based system might fit better to such economies.
The foregoing suggests that the real consequences of financial architecture should depend on a host of country specific factors including the contractual, legal and institutional environment of the country, and the associated degree of agency and informational problems in the economy. These factors systematically vary across groups of countries. For example, weak legal systems, poor property rights and fragile regulatory institutions characterize less developed countries (La Porta et al (1998)) leading to financial underdevelopment (La porta et al (1997) ). Furthermore, due to lack of transparency, weak accounting standards and porous regulations, informational asymmetry and agency problems tend to be worse in emerging economies than in advanced countries. This is also so because the bulk of firms in these countries tend to be small and less mature, and that, even in advanced economies, smaller firms tend to be more prone to adverse selection and moral hazard problems. This diversity in contractual and informational environment across countries leads one to expect a systematic pattern in the effectiveness of different financial architectures. Given the weak legal and institutional structure in financially underdeveloped countries, it appears more likely for bank-based financial architecture to prevail and be more effective in these countries. Similarly, one is more likely to find effective bank-based architectures in countries that are dominated by firms that are observationally more prone to informational and agency problems, such as small and emerging firms.
Based on industry-level data from a panel of thirty-six countries, this paper explores how a country's financial architecture affects performance in the real sector of the economy. We would like to see if real economic performance varies across countries of differing financial architecture. In particular, we would like to see if the relative performance of bank-based vis a vis market-based systems vary between financially developed and financially underdeveloped economies, and among countries of differing size distribution of firms.
We find that financial architecture is not a matter of indifference in that real economic performance varies systematically across economies with differing financial system architecture. Across countries with underdeveloped financial sectors, industries from bank based economies grow faster than industries from market based systems, while industries in market-based systems grow faster across countries with developed financial systems. That is, the degree of market orientation of the financial system is significantly positively related to economic performance in countries with developed financial sectors, whereas this relation is significantly negative in countries with underdeveloped financial sectors.
We find that bank-based financial architecture outperforms market-based systems across countries dominated by small firms while market-based architecture fares well across countries populated with larger firms. There are substantial fixed costs in issuing securities, making it a viable financing option mostly to large and stable firms. Small firms suffer from severe adverse selection and moral hazard problems resulting in direct access to markets to be significantly costly. As a result, the size distribution of firms appears to be a key determinant of the composition of financing. Even in advanced countries, small firms rely on bank financing more so than on markets (Peterson and Rajan (1995) ).
The findings indicate that financial architecture, in and of itself, could be a source of value. A lack of fit between the financial architecture, and the legal and institutional preconditions could retard economic performance. The results also suggest that the recent trend in policy-making circles of prescribing market-based systems indiscriminately across emerging and transition economies might be misguided. Markets require requisite institutional and legal infrastructure. In situations where strong contractual environment is lacking, as in many emerging and transition economies, there is more economic value in strengthening the banking sector. The key feature of relationshipbased financial systems is the relative lack of competition and transparency, potentially causing inefficient investment and financing decisions as there would be a lack of external price signals to guide decisions. On the other hand, relationship-based finance has an important advantage of being flexible in accommodating firms with short-term difficulties that have otherwise long term prospect. Established relationships enable creditors to benefit from future successes, as well as 'dynamically cross-subsidize' younger, potentially profitable firms with short-term financial difficulty from mature firms that have the ability to pay.
The paper is related to Levine (2002) and Beck and Levine (2000) . In a cross- investigate the existence and strength of association between financial architecture and economic performance across sub groups of countries that differ structurally. In this paper, we examine the relations between financial architecture and real economic performance across countries of differing distribution of firm size to investigate the role of diverse informational environment in explaining the relative performance of bank vs market based systems. We find that this correlation is significantly negative in the lowest quartile of countries on the average firm-size scale and significantly positive in the highest quartile of countries. Similarly, we report a significant positive relation between financial architecture and performance among financially developed countries and a significant inverse relation in financially underdeveloped countries.
We use industry level data for ten industries in a cross-section of thirty-six countries over the period 1980 through 1995. Because we attempt to explain average performance over this period, we deal with an unbalanced panel with a maximum of 360 data points. We effectively control for unobservable country and industry related determinants of growth through random effects. Levine (2002) is based on country level data with a sample size of 48 data points, using explicit controls. Levine and Beck (2000) use industry level data as ours to see if growth rates of industries that differ in external financial dependence depend on countries' financial architecture. They do not examine differences in the role of financial architecture across countries that differ in contractual and informational environments the way we do.
The balance of the paper is as follows. Section II introduces the data and the empirical methodology. Section III report the main results and Section IV concludes.
II. Data and Methodology
Our database combines international data on financial architecture and on financial development, industry level data on economic performance, and various measures of the legal and institutional environments of countries. We have complete data on these sets of variables for thirty-six countries. We have data on financial architecture and financial development for a large cross-section of countries, but industry performance data only for a matching 36 countries, thus limiting the size of our sample.
A. Financial Architecture
There is a lack of uniformly accepted empirical definition of whether a given country's financial system is market-based or bank-based. Previous studies use stylized facts based on a handful of countries, such as Germany as representation of bank-based system and the U.S. as a prototype of market-based system. We use a variety of financial architecture indicators based on aggregate cross-country data recently compiled at the World Bank. The data set described in Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (1999) contains measures of the relative size, activity, and efficiency of the banking and market sub-sectors of the financial system for a broad cross-section of countries over the period 1980 to 1995 which also coincides with the period for which we have data on economic performance. For this study, we use two measures of financial architecture as described Architecture-Activity: measures the activity of stock markets relative to that of banks, and is denoted by the ratio of total value of stocks traded to bank credit ratio.
Total value traded as a share of GDP measures stock market activity relative to economic activity, and bank credit ratio (defined above) also indicate the importance of banks in the economic activities of the private sector.
Architecture-Efficiency: measures the relative efficiency of a country's stock markets vis a vis that of its banks. Efficiency of stock markets is measured by the total value traded ratio defined to be the share of total value of shares traded to GDP.
Efficiency of banking is measured by overhead costs defined to be the ratio of banking overhead costs to banking assets. Architecture-Efficiency is the product of total value traded ratio and overhead costs. Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (1999) also present measures using turnover ratio (instead of value traded) and find no different rankings.
ARCHITECTURE, the conglomerate measure, takes, after removing the means of each series, the average of capitalization to bank credit ratio, value traded to bank credit ratio, and the product of value traded and overhead costs. For robustness, we also develop an alternative aggregation of the architecture variables. We generate a conglomerate measure as a principal component of the three architecture variables.
Market: MARKET, our alternative measure, is a dummy variable and classifies countries as market-based if they fall above the mean of the ARCHITECTURE, the conglomerate index, and as bank-based if they score below the mean of the index. Table 1 presents country classifications based on financial architecture and financial development (discussed below). The top two panels list countries with marketbased financial architecture and the bottom two provide a list of bank-based systems.
The average of the ARCHITECTURE variable for the market-based countries is 0.866 and that for bank based countries is -0.38141. The difference is statistically significant at 1 percent. This is true comparing market-based economies and bank-based economies across underdeveloped countries (0.5300 against -0.40889), as well as across developed economies (1.09 against -0.3608).
B. Financial Development
To control for the overall development of the financial systems, we classify countries into financially developed and financially underdeveloped based on two indices. Following Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1999), we define a country as having underdeveloped financial system if it scores below the mean on both bank development and stock market development. Specifically, an underdeveloped financial system will have (1) lower than the mean for Bank-Credit ratio, and (2) lower than the mean for value traded ratio (i.e. value traded to GDP ratio). Table 1 provides the classification of countries by financial development.
Countries on the left two panels are countries with under-developed financial sectors, and those on the right two panels are countries with developed financial systems. In this classification, Denmark is considered financially underdeveloped because it registers below the average on bank development and stock market development 1 . Measures of bank and stock market development are significantly higher in financially developed countries than in underdeveloped countries. The average bank ratio for developed countries is 0.728 versus 0.255 for underdeveloped countries; stock value traded to GDP ratio is 0.327 in developed countries versus 0.072 in underdeveloped countries.
C. Economic Performance
We use industry level data obtained from the United Nations Industrial Database to construct economic performance measures. The database contains data on the production and cost structure of manufacturing industries for the sample of countries.
We use data on ten representative manufacturing industries. The economic performance measures include annual growth in industry real value added, growth in productivity and growth in production and economic efficiency. Real value-added is gross output less intermediate inputs, all stated in real terms.
Growth in value added could be a result of growth in factors of production and improvements in productivity. Productivity improvements, in turn, can be decomposed into growth in the efficiency with which resources are utilized given the technology of the firm, and technological change which reflects improvements in products and processes. Efficiency improvements are measured in reference to cross-country production (and cost) functions as representations of the best practice technology.
Production efficiency is a measure of how close an industry becomes to the best practice production frontier in its production structure. Economic efficiency is how closer an industry gets to the best-practice cost frontier in its cost structure. These measures are obtained from Tadesse (2000) which presents details on the their construction. Table 1 provides a summary of these performance measures for each country in the sample and summaries for the sub-sample of countries. Table 2 provides a simple comparison of performance between market-based and bank-based systems without making distinction based on financial development or firm size. For the full sample, there is no discernable difference in economic performance (for any of the performance measures) between bank-based countries and market-based economies. The same is true between financially developed countries and financially underdeveloped countries (see Table 2 ). Notice in Table 1 , however, the differences in economic performance between market-based (top two panels) and bank-based economies (bottom two panels) for the developed (right two panels) and underdeveloped (left two panels) sub sample respectively. On each performance measure, the average economic performance of bankbased systems is significantly higher than that of market based systems across financially underdeveloped countries. For example, growth in value added (0.0665 against 0.009), growth in production efficiency (0.002 versus -0.0006) and growth in economic efficiency (-0.007 versus -0.1597). The reverse is true (i.e. economic performance is better in market-based economies than in bank-based economies) among the countries that have developed financial systems.
III. Results
A. Financial Architecture, Financial Development and Economic Performance
As a preliminary step to gauge the relations between financial architecture and performance, we begin with a difference in means tests of economic performance between market-based systems and bank based systems. Table 3 groups countries into those with underdeveloped and those with developed financial systems. Within each group, we then compare economic performance measures between countries of marketbased architecture and those with bank-based systems.
Across countries with developed financial systems, economic performance is significantly larger in countries with market-based financial architecture than in those with bank-based architecture. Conversely, across countries with underdeveloped financial systems, economic performance is significantly larger in countries with bankbased systems than in those with market-based architecture. This is true nearly for all measures of economic performance. For example, the average realized real growth rate in value added for market-based, financially well developed countries, 3.7%, is statistically larger than that for bank-based financially well-developed countries (0.8%).
On the other hand, growth rate in value added for bank-based, financially underdeveloped countries, 6.3%, statistically dominates that for bank-based, financially underdeveloped countries, 0.5%. Across developed financial systems, the average growth rate in production efficiency for market-based economies (0.0008) is significantly larger than that for bank-based economies (-0.0004). For financially developed countries, the average growth rate in production efficiency for bank-based economies (0.002) is significantly larger than that for market-based economies (-0.0008).
To further explore the patterns of relations that are emerging in the data, while controlling for potential country and industry heterogeneity that may derive the preliminary findings, we estimate empirical models in which we attempt to explain cross country variation in growth in real value added based on variations in financial architecture. We first estimate a regression model in which we include country and industry characteristics explicitly to control for these potential country and industry heterogeneity. Among the country characteristics, we include initial per capita GDP to control for the well-known convergence effect. As an industry characteristic, we include the output share of an industry to the total manufacturing output of the country to control for the relative importance of the industry in the country.
Finally, we estimate a random-effects specification of the following form where, besides the explicit controls, the latent country-related and industry-related sources of variations on growth are effectively accounted for: 
The model is a three-way error component specification with random country and industry effects to explicitly account for the cross-correlation between error terms for observations in the same country and the same industry respectively. FA is either of the financial architecture variables: ARCHITECTURE, the conglomerate measure of the market-orientation of the financial system, or MARKET, the dummy variable that takes 1 if the financial system is classified as market-oriented and 0 if not. FD is indicator of financial development in a given country. Specifically, we use the dummy variable UNDER, which takes the value 1 for financially underdeveloped systems to indicate financial development. Z represents a host of explicit control variables. In all the specifications, we include initial per capita GDP of countries to control for the impact of initial conditions on economic growth. We also include the output share of an industry to the total manufacturing output of the country. λ, and η, are random country and industry effects intended to capture the latent country-related and industry-related sources of variations on growth. The dependent variable, G, is the average annual growth rate in value added of industry i, in country c over the period 1980 through 1995. (Summary statistics for the variables is provided in Appendix I). We expect a positive relation between growth and financial architecture in financially developed economies and negative in financially underdeveloped ones. Table 4 presents the results of regressions across 10 industries in 36 countries around the world. We use the dummy variable UNDER, which takes the value 1 for financially underdeveloped systems to indicate financial development. For measuring financial systems architecture, we use the dummy variable MARKET which takes 1 for market-based systems and, alternatively, the continuous variable ARCHITECTURE. The focal variables for testing the hypotheses are the interaction variables: UNDER X MARKET and UNDER X ARCHITECTURE.
From the OLS regressions, in column I, the coefficient on the interaction between UNDER and MARKET is negative and statistically significant, implying that, other things equal, market orientation of the financial system is inversely related to growth in real output in financially underdeveloped countries. The MARKET variable enters with positive sign, implying a positive relation between market orientation and growth in financially developed countries, though this relation is somehow weaker than for financially underdeveloped countries. Column II reports similar results based on the continuous variable ARCHITECTURE. The coefficient on the variable ARCHITECTURE is positive and highly statistically significant, implying that, among countries that are financially developed, market orientation of a financial system is positively associated with growth. The interaction variable between ARCHITECTURE and UNDER is negative and statistically significant at 1 % significance level. The absolute value of this coefficient (0.046) is very large in magnitude compared to the coefficient for ARCHITECTURE (0.017). This implies that, other things equal, across countries that are financially underdeveloped, relatively market-based systems tend to achieve lower output growth.
As would be expected, per Capita GDP has significant negative coefficients.
Poorer countries grow faster, other things equal. The magnitude of the implied rate of convergence is comparable to what is found in the growth literature. Industry effects appear to be less important as the industry's share in total manufacturing output has no relationship with industry growth.
The OLS regressions include explicit controls of a country factor in the form of per capita GDP and an industry factor in terms of industry's share in total manufacturing.
As there is a host of other country and industry related factors that could derive the cross sectional variations in output growth, we introduce a random-effects specification where, besides the explicit controls, the latent, unobservable country-related and industry-related sources of variations in growth are properly accounted for. The random-effects regressions provide similar results. In column I, the interaction between UNDER and MARKET is negative and statistically significant, implying that, other things equal, across countries that are financially underdeveloped, industries grow faster in those countries with bank-based financial systems. In column II, the coefficient for ARCHITECTURE is positive and significant, indicating that in financially developed countries, market orientation is positively related to industry growth. On the other hand, the interaction term is negative and significant. The magnitude of this coefficient is larger than the coefficient on ARCHITECTURE. Financial architecture, the relative market orientation of financial system, is inversely related to industry growth in financially underdeveloped economies. Increasing market-orientation slows growth in financially underdeveloped countries; yet it increases growth in financially developed countries. For example, a one standard deviation (0.654) increase in ARCHITECTURE slows industry growth by an average rate of 1.7 % in financially underdeveloped economies while the same change in the variable increases industry growth in value added by about 1.2 % in financially developed countries. A gross indicator of the severity of agency problems across countries might be the dominance of small versus large firms in the given country. While agency problems prevail across firm types, it can be argued that moral hazard is more severe among lessreputed and less-transparent small firms. One can then classify countries by the average size of a typical firm as indicator of whether a country is populated by less reputed small firms implying heightened problem of moral hazard.
Aside from moral hazard, small and large firms face differences in the degree of barriers to entry to the securities markets. There are substantial fixed costs in issuing securities, making it a viable financing option mostly to large and stable firms. Even in advanced countries, small firms rely on bank financing more so than on markets. This could be partly due to the fact that small firms suffer from severe adverse selection and moral hazard problems resulting in direct access to markets to be significantly costly. As a result, the size distribution of firms appears to be a key determinant of the composition of financing. Table 5 presents a difference in means test of economic performance for countries classified by the size of the average (or typical) firm in the manufacturing sector. We have data on the total number of firms and total real gross output in the manufacturing sector of each country. Size of the average firm is calculated as total manufacturingsector gross output divided by total number of firms in the manufacturing sector. The (log of) size of the average firm ranges from 7.68 in Jordan to 12.352 in Germany. The size distribution appears to correlate with the level of development of countries. Dividing the sample into two, small firm countries generally include emerging economies such as Sri Lanka, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Peru and others; and large firm countries include such developed economies as Germany, Finland, Austria, Canada, the U.S and others.
We categorize countries into quartiles by the size of the typical firm in each country. Table 5 ARCHITECTURE is a continuous variable denoting the relative market orientation of the financial system. The focal variables of interest are the interaction between financial architecture and firm-size: MARKET X SIZE and ARCHITECTURE X SIZE. We expect the coefficients of the interaction terms to be significantly negative.
Column I and column II report the results using the MARKET variable and the ARCHITECTURE variables respectively. From the OLS results, the coefficient on the size variable is negative and significant, implying that countries dominated by smaller firms tend to grow slower. The coefficient on the interaction term is negative and statistically significant at 1%. The interpretation is that in countries that are dominated by smaller firms, market-based financial systems retard growth (inversely bank-based systems promote growth). This is also true in column II where we use the continuous ARCHITECTURE variable. The interaction term is significantly negative implying that market-orientation is inversely related to growth in countries dominated by smaller firms.
In column II, furthermore, the coefficient on SIZE is negative and significant, indicating that, other things constant, countries with small firms grow slower on average. Similar results obtain in the random-effects specification. In column I, the interaction MARKET X SIZE is negative and highly significant, indicating that market-based systems retard growth in countries dominated by smaller firms. The size variable has a negative coefficient, but is statistically not significant; hence, other things equal, being a country with predominantly small firms or predominantly large firms has no impact on growth.
In column II, the interaction term has a significant negative coefficient, again indicating an inverse relation between market orientation and industry growth in countries with smaller firms. Columns III and IV report results controlling for market turnover ratio and bank ratio as proxies for capital market functions. The evidence that marketorientation adversely impacts industry growth in countries with small firms is robust both in the OLS and random-effects specifications. The coefficients of the interaction terms are significantly negative. 
C. Robustness
In this subsection, we briefly describe the results of some of the robustness checks of our findings. One major concern is the difficulty of classifying countries as marketbased or bank-oriented and whether the results are shaped by the particular classification scheme adopted in the paper. In the analysis, we classified countries based on the means-removed average of the size, activity and efficiency measures of countries' financial architecture. For robustness, we generated a different ranking of countries This is an ad-hoc classification in the sense that it is not generated by the data. The results
(not reported) are robust to this classification. The interaction between the architecture variable MARKET and UNDER is negative and statistically significant at ten percent and is of equivalent magnitude (-0.057). Market-oriented financial systems retard growth (or conversely, bank-oriented systems promote growth) in financially underdeveloped economies. The coefficient of the interaction term between SIZE and the financial architecture variable MARKET is negative (-0.11) and statistically significant at one percent, implying that market-oriented systems retard growth (and conversely, bankoriented systems promote growth) in countries dominated by smaller firms.
In the original regressions where we classify countries by typical firm size, we categorize countries into 3 size categories, and we compare the top and bottom third as large firm and small firm countries respectively. This classification results in the U.K.
and Japan in the middle category. We include the two countries in the large category to 
IV. Conclusion
Countries differ in the way their financial sector is configured, ranging from the market-based systems typical of the Anglo-Saxon traditions to bank-centered systems characteristic of Continental Europe and Japan. An important issue in corporate finance is the question of whether this diversity in financial system architecture has any consequence to economic performance in the real sector. Does a financial architecture anchored on markets work better than one centered on banks, and if so, under what conditions?
Based on industry-level data from a panel of thirty-six countries, the paper examines how a country's financial architecture affects performance in the real sector of the economy. We argue that the relative effectiveness of a given architecture depends on the level of development of the financial sector, the latter being a reflection of the supporting legal and institutional environment, and the prevalence and severity of informational and agency problems in the economy.
We find that financial architecture is not a matter of indifference in that real economic performance varies systematically across economies with differing financial system architecture. Across countries with developed financial sectors, industries supported by market-based financial systems grow faster than industries with bank-based systems. Conversely, bank-based financial systems significantly outperform marketbased systems across countries with underdeveloped financial sectors. Furthermore, we find that market-oriented systems retard economic growth and conversely, bank-oriented systems promote growth in countries dominated by smaller firms.
The evidence suggests that financial architecture, in and of itself, could be a source of value. A lack of fit between the legal and institutional preconditions, and the financial architecture retards economic performance. A market-oriented financial system does not fit well with an environment of weak contractability and lack of respect to the law. On the other hand, a synergic fit between the financial architecture and the contractual environment fosters economic growth. In view of the evidence, recent directions in capital-market-development policy that prescribe market-oriented financial systems indiscriminately, particularly in emerging and transition economies might be misguided. It suggests that in situations where the requisite legal and institutional preconditions are lacking, economies fare much better through strengthening their banking sector instead.
Financially Underdeveloped -Market-Based Systems
Financially Developed -Market-Based Systems Industry growth in real value added is the average annual compounded growth rate in real value added for each of the ten industries in each of the thirty-six countries over the period 1980 to 1995. Productivity and efficiency are computed based on parameter estimates of cross-country stochastic production and cost frontiers on the panel of industry production and cost data. Production efficiency measures the degree to which an industry diverges from the efficient production frontier. Economic efficiency measures the degree to which an industry diverges from the best practice cost frontier. Financial Architecture is a continuous variable that measures the degree of market orientation of a financial system and is an average of the means-removed values of size, activity and efficiency measures. Market based dummy is a variable that takes 1 if the financial system is classified as market-based and 0 if it is bank-based. Developed financial systems are countries with above average stock market liquidity and the ratio of bank credit to private sector to GDP.
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Growth Industry growth in real value added is the average annual compounded growth rate in real value added for each of the ten industries in each of the thirty-six countries over the period 1980 to 1995. Productivity and efficiency are computed based on parameter estimates of cross-country stochastic production and cost frontiers on the panel of industry production and cost data. Production efficiency measures the degree to which an industry diverges from the efficient production frontier. Economic efficiency measures the degree to which an industry diverges from the best practice cost frontier. Financial Architecture is a continuous variable that measures the degree of market orientation of a financial system and is an average of the means-removed values of size, activity efficiency measures. Market based dummy is a variable that takes 1 if the financial system is classified as market-based and 0 if it is bank-based. Developed financial systems are countries with above average stock market liquidity and the ratio of bank credit to private sector to GDP. The dependent variable is average annual growth in real value added. The parameter estimates are maximum likelihood estimates of regression equations containing random country and industry effects. The OLS equations do not contain random effects. ARCHITECTURE is a continuous variable that measures the degree of market orientation of a financial system and is a means-removed average of the size, activity, efficiency dimensions of financial architecture. MARKET is a dummy variable that takes 1 if the financial system is classified as market-based and 0 if it is bank-based. UNDER is an indicator variable that takes 1 for countries classified as financially underdeveloped and 0 otherwise. Stock market turnover is total value of shares traded divided by market capitalization. Bank credit ratio is claims of deposit money banks against the private sector divided by GDP. All regressions also contain log of initial per capita income and industry share in manufacturing (not reported). Industry Share in Manufacturing is calculated by dividing the real output of the industry in the country by the total real output of the manufacturing sector of the country. Coefficients of the country and industry effects are not reported. Asymptotic standard errors are given in parenthesis. I  II  III  IV  I  II  III Industry growth rate in value added is average annual growth rate over 1980 through 1995. Productivity and efficiency are computed based on parameter estimates of crosscountry stochastic production and cost frontiers on the panel of industry production and cost data. Production efficiency measures the degree to which an industry diverges from the efficient production frontier. Economic efficiency measures the degree to which an industry diverges from the best practice cost frontier. Architecture is a continuous variable that measures the degree of market orientation of a financial system and is a means-removed average of the size, activity, efficiency dimensions of financial architecture. Firm size is total real output of the manufacturing sector of the country divided by the number of firms in the manufacturing sector. I  II  III  IV  I  II  III The dependent variable is average annual growth in value added. The parameter estimates are maximum likelihood estimates of regression equations containing random country and industry effects. Architecture is a continuous variable that measures the degree of market orientation of a financial system and is a principal component of the size, activity, efficiency dimensions of financial architecture. Market is a dummy variable that takes 1 if the financial system is classified as market-based and 0 if it is bank-based. Under is an indicator variable that takes 1 for countries classified as financially underdeveloped and 0 otherwise. Size is an indicator variable that takes 1 for countries with smaller average manufacturing firm size, and 0 otherwise. Industry Share in Manufacturing is calculated by dividing the real output of the industry in the country by the total real output of the manufacturing sector of the country. 
OLS Random Effects
Appendix I: Summary Statistics
UNDER is an indicator variable that takes 1 for countries classified as financially underdeveloped and 0 otherwise. MARKET is a dummy variable that takes 1 if the financial system is classified as market-based and 0 if it is bank-based. ARCHITECTURE is a continuous variable that measures the degree of market orientation of a financial system and is a means-removed average of the size, activity, efficiency dimensions of financial architecture. Average Firm size is calculated as total real output of the manufacturing sector of the country divided by the number of firms in the manufacturing sector. SIZE is an indicator variable that takes 1 for countries with smaller average manufacturing firm size and 0 otherwise. Stock market turnover is total value of shares traded divided by market capitalization. Bank credit ratio is claims of deposit money banks against the private sector divided by GDP. Industry Share in Manufacturing is calculated by dividing the real output of the industry in the country by the total real output of the manufacturing sector of the country. 
